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**Interview of Former Special Agent of the FBI  
Kathleen M. Puckett, Ph.D. (1978-2001)  
Susan Wynkoop, Interviewer  
Interviewed on October 8, 2008**

*Edited for spelling, repetitions, etc. by Sandra Robinette on November 28, 2008. Edited with Dr. Puckett's corrections and ready for publication on February 4, 2009.*

Wynkoop

(W): Today is October the 8<sup>th</sup>, 2008 and I'm going to be interviewing Kathleen Puckett who was an Agent from 1998 through 2001

Puckett

(P): 1978.

W: I'm sorry; I have that written down 1978 through 2001. I just want to read the Release Form which Kathleen has signed and I have signed.

“We the undersigned convey the rights to the intellectual content of our interview on this date to the Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI. This transfer is in exchange for the Society's efforts to preserve this historical legacy of the FBI and its members. We understand that portions of this interview may be deleted for security purposes.

Unless otherwise restricted we agree that acceptable sections can be published on the worldwide web and the recordings transferred to an established repository for preservation and research. “

That was, as I said, signed and dated by both of us and at this time I'm going to start the interview with Kathleen and just discuss a little bit Kathleen about your background, where you were born and your education.

P: Sure. I was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1950, a baby boomer. My dad was in construction and mom was a homemaker, and we moved from Wisconsin to California in 1958, where I was raised in southern California in a suburb of Los Angeles called Whittier.

W: Okay.

P: That was where I had my primary and also my high school education. I went to college from 1968 to 1972 at the University of California at Santa Barbara, where I started in English studies but soon changed to Anthropology studies with a minor in History, and that's what I graduated with in 1972.

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W: An anthropologist huh?

P: Bachelor's in Anthropology with a minor in History, which qualified me to do pretty much nothing.

W: Well now, I know exactly your feeling on that.

P: (Laughing). So I had school loans and things to pay. I'm the oldest of three girls, so there wasn't a lot of money in the family. At that time it was 1972; I went to Europe and did the classic, you know, tramping around Europe with my friends for the summer, and then came back home.

W: Right.

P: Got a job and got some money together and joined the Air Force. I was recruited into the Officer's Program, the Officer's Training Program. They had a program where if you served a period of four years they would forgive up to fifty percent of your school debt.

W: That's awesome.

P: You know, at the time there was really no equity as far as women getting paid any kind of equal amount to men.

W: You're exactly right.

P: Yeah. The military was the only place that I could find at the time that paid a living wage, and also paid women the same as men. So I went into the Air Force in 1973 and was first an Administrative Officer for a Military Airlift Command flying squadron at Norton Air Force Base in San Bernardino, California. It's since closed. But then I got interested in doing investigative work, and was recruited into the Office of Special Investigations in the Air Force. Which was actually set up in the fifties, I understand, by two FBI Agents.

W: That's interesting.

P: Yeah, they set up the OSI - Office of Special Investigations - in the Air Force, on the model of the FBI. Which is why it was so much easier - you know, as the years progressed and I became an FBI Agent - it was always easier to work with the Air Force because they had a kind of complementary organizational structure.

W: Wow!

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P: Yeah, it was interesting. For example, like the FBI, the OSI does both Criminal and Counter-Intelligence work. It's different in the Army or the Navy, where those missions are handled by two different organizations. I think it makes for a much more integrated approach. So I was transferred as an OSI agent to McCord Air Force Base in Washington State at the end of 1973.

W: Okay.

P: It was adjacent to an Army post, Fort Lewis, in the Seattle area. At first I worked mostly Fraud and general criminal cases, working a lot of joint cases with the FBI Field Office in Seattle and the RA in Tacoma. I started getting interested in working Soviet shipping. Soviet ships were docking up at the Seattle port and there were U.S. submarine bases nearby - this is all public knowledge now - this was the mid-seventies and so there was a lot of intelligence activity, and I got a lot of experience working with the Bureau working those cases.

W: During those years.

P: Eventually I was promoted to Captain and offered a regular commission. I was a Reserve Officer because I was trained in Texas at Lackland Air Force Base. I was one of those sixteen-week wonders.

W: Yeah, wow.

P: So they offered me a regular commission and an assignment overseas to Ankara, Turkey as a source control officer. It would have meant working with the Turks, who weren't enthusiastic about working with women in general! Also they were shooting Air Force officers on the street in Ankara and also in Athens, where I had traveled after college. I loved Greece.

I was weighing whether I would stay with the Air Force. I didn't really think I was going to, and I was approached by both the FBI and the CIA because, like I said, I had been working counter-intelligence cases.

W: I read that. Now how did you choose, you know, what did the FBI give you, or bring?

P: Well, it was interesting. I knew and worked with a lot of Agency people, the same with a lot of Bureau people. The Agency kind of offered me the moon and the stars. They flew me to several different places to meet case officers, where they'd take me to dinner and put me up at a hotel. I had fallen in love with Greece when I was there after college. They said, "We'll teach you Greek, you'll be a covert operations officer." And I thought well, this sounds really interesting. I mean, it really was thrilling and it was fascinating to talk to the officers.

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P: Regarding the FBI, of course, I knew far more about what their day to day work was, because I was working with Agents on several joint cases.

W: Exactly.

P: And so Natalie **Sabin** - who later became Natalie Gore when she married Bill Gore in the Bureau - Natalie Sabin was an Agent in the FBI Office in Seattle and she and I had lunch one day, and she described to me in detail what life was like in the FBI. It struck me that it was a far better balance personally for me, not being married, and not having any other kind of anchor. I was too immature at the time to live overseas, and I realized that I wanted to be able to - I wanted to be a little more grounded than that. I wanted to be able to tell people my real name, for example.

W: Exactly.

P: I wanted to be able to tell my family what I was doing in general.

W: Right.

P: You know, not necessarily specifically. That wouldn't have been possible in the Agency, and I knew even at the time that my own psychology needed a little bit more unified and grounded approach. And the Bureau had a much different feeling to me than the Agency did. The Agency was very exciting at the time in the seventies. A lot of things were going on, but it didn't have the family feeling that the FBI did.

W: That's interesting because I think you're exactly right and for you to have gotten those vibrations, that's very important.

P: And you know at twenty-seven, I was kind of a callow youth. I mean it wasn't like I knew a lot about what I was doing but I was kind of operating on instinct.

I went through both recruitment procedures and it was funny, because the Agency would fly me around and wine and dine me, take me out to dinner, and I'd meet all these operational people. The Bureau said, "The test is being given here, and no, we don't validate parking."

W: Right.

P: (Laughing) I thought - okay, pretty down to earth - and so I interviewed in Seattle. By that time that I had decided that I would not stay with the Air Force and I would go with either the Bureau or the Agency. So I was weighing both still, got out of the Air Force in the early part of seventy-eight, I was still up in Washington, so drove down and went to stay with my parents for about a three month period while I weighed which one I was gonna go with. The same day that I reported in May 1978, to Quantico, was the same day I was supposed to report to Langley.

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W: Isn't that something? That's amazing.

P: Yeah. It was interesting because they were both expecting me. My parents got a call on the date that I was supposed to appear, and said, "Did she go with the Bureau?" (Laughing). They wasted a lot of time and energy and money on me I think, the Agency did, but my dad said, "Yup, she went with the FBI."

W: That's something. That really is, and hopefully you never regretted that decision.

P: No. I never did, because I got to do so many things. Counter-Intelligence to me is – I mean, I know and respect Intelligence work. I know many Intel officers and I understand their world very well, but counter-intelligence and the puzzles that were posed by FBI work were far more challenging and interesting to me than the kind of well – manipulation, frankly that is necessary in intelligence. I just didn't want that kind of life.

W: Always having to think in your mind, "Who am I now," sort of.

P: Not only that, but who am I going to manipulate here into betraying their country.

W: Right.

P: When I went to Quantico... You know, it was 1978, it was May, and it was hot. God, it was hot there in Quantico, and I was from southern California with its dry heat and no humidity and you know those black flag days at Quantico when you couldn't run?

W: Yes.

P: I was not an athletic specimen either, so it took me awhile to get the run down. For me, the hardest part was the physical training. I was tall and relatively strong but very unfit by FBI standards, so I ran through a lot of shin splints. I was lucky that I got through without a real injury. Basically, I was strong and young enough to get fit at Quantico. It was probably the most fit I'd ever been.

W: But the firearms you did fine with?

P: Firearms, I did great.

W: Oh good.

P: And the legal part was always very fascinating and easy for me. Everything was easy for me but the physical stuff.

W: I think everyone has that one area that they really have to work on.

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P: Yeah, some vulnerability. We generally helped each other. I would help a lot of other people with some of the legal stuff. I was always kind of a student type, you know, I was always kind of interested in information processing and analyzing stuff. So I didn't have a problem with that, and the firearms was easy for me because I had a kind of a natural ability for it. I became like, in San Francisco I became kind of skeet champion.

W: Oh, that's great.

P: Yeah, to their consternation, I was always beating the SWAT guys at skeet shoots and that really did not go down well with them.

W: Because that's a real talent; skeet shooting. I think is very fun.

P: Oh it's fun.

W: You know, you really have to work at that.

P: Yeah, it was fun. I did have a good time with that. But then, the Quantico training, I was very, very happy by the end of it, to have made it through. Our class, there were twenty-nine in our class, only two women. Ellie Benish, my roommate, was the only other woman. She had been a clerk as they called it then in the Bureau for twelve years before she went into the Agent program. So, you know, I had somebody's brain to pick there.

Out of all my class most of the people in my class went to New York and I was sent to San Francisco, which I was just deliriously happy with ...

W: That's amazing.

P: ... because I was a Californian.

W: That's amazing.

P: So San Francisco was my office of origin and also my only permanent office in the Bureau for the whole twenty-three years that I was in.

W: That's amazing. That's what I thought it looked like, or I wasn't sure if you went back to Quantico for further you know, or headquarters at any point, but it looked like you had just been in San Francisco that whole time, which is great.

P: Well, I had long TDYs ...

W: Exactly.

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P: I had case-related long TDYs where I would go to D.C. and New York because I was involved with the Behavioral Analysis Program later. But other than that, I was pretty much in, centered in and worked in the San Francisco area. It was wonderful to stay on the West Coast. I'm a West Coast person, so for me, I was unusually lucky in that I was one of those people where, when we first came in seventy-eight - you probably remember, Susan - it was like you'd go to one of the top ten offices.

W: Exactly, that's what we did.

P: San Francisco was one of the top ten, so I was able to say, 'Well I would go [to] L.A. or San Francisco.' I put San Francisco as my second choice because I had a hunch that somebody would say, "Well, let's give her San Francisco, we're not going to give her her first choice," which is exactly what happened (laughing).

W: That's something. You had them figured out, that's for sure.

P: (Laughing) Yeah.

W: So, prior to the FBI, I guess, you didn't have any psychological training?

P: No psychology training and no investigative training, and nobody in the family was in the FBI or had ever been in law enforcement.

W: That's something. That's quite a jump isn't it? Oh wow!

So you were, as you said, in San Francisco that whole time. Just one other question, and then I want to get to the amazing cases that you worked, but you didn't actually go through the profiler training at Quantico?

P: No, I didn't.

W: Okay.

P: When I showed up in San Francisco, it was September 12, 1978. Right after that things started happening. Dan White, a Supervisor in San Francisco, shot both the Mayor and a gay supervisor in their offices. At nearly the same time the Jonestown mass suicide took place.

W: Yes, yes.

P: Jonestown, Guiana. So I was involved in both of those cases initially, right when I landed in San Francisco. I was assigned to the Fugitive Squad for the first year that I was there. So I got some more experience with criminal work, and I had had experience with criminal work anyway in OSI in the Air Force.

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P: But within a year, since I'd had experience in Seattle working Soviet shipping, they kind of recruited me onto the FCI side. I was put onto a squad that handled the Soviet Bloc. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany - you know, the Soviet satellites. After that, I was the first woman to move onto the Soviet Squad, which - unbeknownst to me (this is all public information now) - unbeknownst to me and anyone else in the office, had recruited a KGB officer in the San Francisco Soviet Consulate.

W: Wow.

P: So I became part of the group that was doing things on the West Coast that were kind of parallel to what was happening, on a larger scale, in New York and Washington.

W: And I guess at that time you went through the language school?

P: I went, yes, I went to Russian language training, and I didn't go to beautiful ...

W: Monterey, was it?

P: Monterey.

W: Yes.

P: No, I went in winter 1983 to a CIA school in Arlington, Virginia.

W: Oh wow. I just assumed you were out there in Monterey.

P: Right. Instead of Monterey, darn it. I could have spent that lovely year in Monterey, but instead I spent nine months in the Washington DC area. So instead of the military language training I would have had at Monterey, I trained with CIA officers. That was really an advantage to me because I ended up using the language quite a bit, when I got back to San Francisco.

W: And are you still able to, have you kept up with it?

P: No, sadly enough.

W: Okay that would be hard to do I'm sure.

P: I always had problems with the reading and I was a little bit lazy with the grammar, but I had a flair for the sound and the music, the accent and the language itself. I actually graduated with a two plus in comprehension and a three in speech which was kind of unheard of for somebody with no history of Slavic language.

W: That's great.

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P: It was fun because I also speak French, and I had a little bit of Greek, so since I had a love for languages, I had a real advantage in training.

W: That's excellent.

P: Yeah.

W: Wow, that's really great and then I know you were very involved in Project Slammer where you did a lot of I guess extensive interviewing of Americans convicted of ...

P: I started that in eighty-eight when I ...

W: espionage, yeah.

P: Dick Ault was one of the first nine profilers of the Behavioral Science Unit at Quantico in the early days. One of the original nine with John Douglas and all those guys. Dick was the only one who was interested in Foreign Counter-Intelligence behavioral work; everybody else wanted to work serial killers.

W: The criminals.

P: Dick was intrigued by Espionage, and you know after 1985 - which was called "The Year of the Spy," when we had the Walker spy ring and a lot of other things - Dick asked a couple of other people at Headquarters whether, if we could profile serial killers, could we profile spies? Kind of learn a little bit more about what makes people do these things.

Well, in 1988, I had also become very interested in psychology, and I had started a Masters program on my own. Having been in the FBI by that time for ten years, I was not really satisfied with my own performance as an Agent. I wasn't happy with the way I was doing interviews. I thought, "I should be doing better than this."

And I got very interested in psychology as a way to look at what made me tick, and what makes everybody else tick - including people who commit espionage.

But when I first started studying psychology, I was actually thinking of leaving the FBI and becoming a practicing psychologist, a clinical psychologist.

W: Wow! Oh gosh I see.

P: I started working with all kinds of people in my psychology coursework, but it turned out that the same time I started my studies, in 1988, Dick Ault called me about working Project Slammer. I knew him from working on a couple of cases where he had come and helped us on the squad that I was working, the Soviet Bloc squad.

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P: The Soviet Empire was breaking up and we had a case on a deep cover Intelligence officer in San Francisco.

It's still not public, so I won't go into specifics, but what was most interesting to me about it was that they couldn't understand what was making this guy tick at all. Dick had come out and worked with me and we had kind of puzzled this guy out. We kind of figured out where he was coming from, and helped the Agents take the case to its conclusion – where they actually recruited this guy. He was a deep cover agent, and of course he had little choice. His government was evaporating back home.

W: Right.

P: So a year or so later, Dick called me about Project Slammer. They recruited about ten of us from the Field. At the time, you didn't need any kind of career boards or anything like that. You just picked who you wanted to do things. The project aimed at detailed interviews of people who had been convicted of espionage, American citizens for the most part. They called it Project Slammer because many of them were in prison for life, and accessible for interview. Those who were incarcerated were most often kind of bored in prison, and would talk about their background.

W: Just gave them something to do.

P: Yeah, yeah.

W: Yeah.

P: So I got involved with Project Slammer, and that that led, within a few years, to the development of the Behavioral Analysis Program. The only reason that happened was because that Dick Ault was retiring from the FBI and they realized, "Oooh, we don't have anybody else to do Foreign Counter-Intelligence Behavioral Analysis."

So Dick and a couple of other people at Headquarters once again handpicked six people from the field and I was one of them.

W: That's great. Boy, your timing, the timing helps doesn't it?

P: Yeah, you know, timing is everything (laughing).

W: It is. You know sometimes it's just oh, that's fantastic.

P: So we were the beginning of the Behavioral Analysis Program – the BAP - in the National Security Division. We had somebody from New York, Washington - I don't know if anybody has interviewed Doug Gregory, but he's one of the greats.

W: And he was from New York?

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P: D.C.

W: Okay.

P: And we had somebody from Chicago, me from San Francisco, somebody from Dallas I think - there were originally six of us. I had known one or two you know, earlier.

We'd get together when we were asked by agents in offices all over the country to look at subjects of FCI cases that were problematical for them. "Who are these people really? Let's get a clue as to who our subject is here and how we can work this case a little bit more intelligently." We just had a ball, you know, traveling all over the country talking to case agents about what made their subjects tick. Because of that, although I was always assigned to San Francisco, I was able to work the big cases in D.C. ...

W: In big cities.

P: ... and New York.

W: Yes that's amazing, that's really fantastic.

P: Without being assigned there, which was like heaven, you know.

W: Exactly.

P: So I was with the BAP at the time in 1994 that Terry Turchie took over the UNABOM Task Force in San Francisco. Terry been my Supervisor at the time we were working the East bloc Intelligence deep cover intelligence officer, so he knew my approach to behavioral work, and he also knew what I was doing in the BAP.

By this time I had gone on in Clinical Psychology from the Masters Program to a Doctoral Program. So I had finished the doctoral curriculum by the end of 1993 and early ninety-four in Clinical Psychology, and I was what they call ABD, which means I was finished "All But Dissertation ..."

W: Oh exactly.

P: I also had to pass my comprehensive exams, then produce my dissertation, which is like writing a book. As hard as I was working, I was really pressured to do all that.

W: And traveling as much as you were.

P: And traveling, right.

W: And being here and there.

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P: Exactly.

W: It's not like you had a computer to carry around.

P: No, it was nothing like that.

W: It had not happened.

P: I had two classes on nights and weekends when I was in San Francisco, and we also had a campus, the Professional School of Psychology in Sacramento, so sometimes I had to drive up there on weekends.

W: Wow! That's amazing.

P: So pretty much I was busy all the time with this. Plus, you know, just the work at the Bureau was getting more and more complex. By the time early 1994 rolled around the UNABOM case was again sinking back into kind of a paralysis because - I don't know if you want me to go into that in any kind of detail about what the case was?

W: Well I'd love to hear, I know you were so involved in that for so many years and I would love to hear as I said how you got involved in it. I know there was like a conflict in this case. I'm sure there were conflicts with numerous people.

P: Oh yeah.

W: I know you and some key people felt once you had identified who it was, as Ted Kaczynski was the sole individual, there were others who - but I would just love to hear your involvement.

P: Sure. Well, I'll try to give you know the interesting things about the case in shorthand, so stop me if I get too detailed, because I could talk about this case forever.

W: Sure.

P: Terry Turchie and I wrote a book together last year called, *Hunting the American Terrorist - the FBI's War on Home-Grown Terror*, where we detailed how we approached the case and what eventually solved it.

It became obvious to Terry when he was given control of the case that the approach that had not worked for sixteen years wasn't going to work any better, so we had to do something differently.

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P: This is what happened. The UNABOM case started in 1978 when a series of four bombings - they didn't really realize it was a serial bomber - began in Chicago. The first two had to do with college campuses, the third one was in a package that exploded in the cargo hold of an American Airlines flight that was flying out of O'Hare to Dulles in 1979. They had to land, but luckily, the primary explosive detonated and the secondary didn't, or the plane would have crashed.

W: Right I remember reading that.

P: And then in 1980, the President of United Airlines got a bomb in a book. With the university and airlines targets, the case became known as UNABOM.

W: Exactly.

P: Chris Ronay at the bomb unit at the FBI Lab was the first one to put it together that this was a serial bomber. So the first four, then, were in Chicago.

A lot of agencies would have part [of the investigation] - years in investigating bombs in Salt Lake City and Berkeley, as well as the University of Michigan. There were two bombs at the University of Berkeley in California, at Corey Hall, which is the headquarters of the Engineering Department there. Then the bomber started targeting computers.

W: And San Francisco became the office of origin, is that correct?

P: Well, what happened was, in 1985 there was a bombing in Sacramento, California that killed Hugh Scrutton, a computer store owner, and two years later in Salt Lake City an identical bomb using the same kind of nondescript materials. The problem was that nothing ever led anywhere forensically with this. Usually you build a bomb case on forensics. And nothing in the UNABOM case forensics ever led anywhere. He was very careful.

W: That's what I read.

P: We ended up finding that he'd made a lot of his materials, cast his own metal, stripped the batteries; there was no way to trace anything back.

P: In 1987 he was seen by a witness placing an identical device to the one that had killed Hugh Scrutton in 1985 in the parking lot of another computer store, and from that came the first composite drawing of the man in the hooded sweatshirt with the sunglasses.

W: Exactly.

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P: Then he wasn't heard from again for six years and four months.

So everybody just packed up again...you know, they would work the heck out of these cases. Each bombing and the ATF would be involved and the United States Postal Inspection Service ...

W: Right.

P: ... and all the different local police and sheriffs, and everybody would work these things intensively and it never would lead anywhere.

W: And that could get frustrating.

P: Tell me about frustrating. And then of course other crime happened and you needed to go off and do something else. So the case would just rumble to a halt every time, even though we knew it was the same guy.

Well in June 1993, after a six year and four month absence from the scene, two devices were received by scientists at opposite ends of the country: at Yale by a computer scientist and at the home of a geneticist in Tiburon in California.

These were new devices. Very lethal. Originally, the bombs had been different sizes and kind of crude, now they were quite evolved and they were the size of a video tape. It was an enhanced and deadly design. These were received in California and –

W: Yale.

P: ... New Haven, Connecticut at Yale. But for the first time, the bomber sent a letter to the *New York Times*, identifying himself as “the anarchist group, FC,” and giving an identifying number so they could claim responsibility for future bombs. Because there was so much activity in California, the Bureau centered the Task Force office of origin in San Francisco and they sent eight executives from the Bureau, Inspectors and SACs and ASACs, to San Francisco to set up this new Task Force in the summer of 1993.

W: Okay.

P: What they started to do initially was just get all of the information together in one place from all over the country, and that took quite a few months.

They got a big computer, they bought it from the Department of Defense. They were going to crunch a lot of data, for example, one of the data bases they crunched in there was all the Illinois drivers licenses - because of the Chicago origin of the case - from something like 1952 to 1981.

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W: Wow.

P: There were huge amounts of data, because once again the forensics on the new bombs led nowhere. It didn't mean that you couldn't, didn't work it. You had to work it to death but they still didn't lead to any one person conclusively.

W: Wow.

P: So after, oh, less than a year, they had a Task Force that once again was petering out.

W: Just sort of going nowhere and everyone's shaking their heads.

P: And the eight executives were promoted (laughing) back to different places at Headquarters. The case landed on Terry, who was by then the Supervisor in the Palo Alto Office. He had done criminal work in his career in Portland, his first office, and also in New York, but he was primarily known for Foreign Counter-Intelligence work. He had a lovely, lovely office and a lovely Resident Agency down in Palo Alto, beautiful little university town – Stanford University, you know.

W: And then they dropped that in his lap.

P: They dropped that in his lap and he got the job that the eight FBI executives had just relinquished. And what he did was he turned the whole thing around. Essentially, Susan, he looked outside the traditional bomb case structure. He recruited several of us from FCI - including myself and Joel Moss who's still in the Bureau at Headquarters right now in the Inspection Division - to join the effort.

We were used to looking for needles in haystacks, and being involved in long and complicated espionage hunts. So this was kind of fascinating. I was fascinated by the case and of course by this time I was psychologically you know ...

W: Ready?

P: ... linked to this incredible puzzle. But I was not an FBI criminal profiler, and this caused all kinds of problems. The Profiling Unit was very angry that Terry essentially dispensed with the services of the Quantico representatives that he had working on the Task Force in San Francisco because not only were they not really working with the Agents, they had other priorities. Also, they had decided that one of the early victims was the Unabomber, and they were pretty fixed on that idea. It was kind of hitting a brick wall.

W: The profilers felt that it was that that was the case?

P: Oh yeah.

W: Yeah.

P: They thought that they had identified the Unabomber; that he was the return addressee on the first bomb. He was a professor in his fifties, which was why their profile was a professor in his fifties. Investigatively they couldn't link this guy by anything other than a kind of hunch these two profiling representatives had when the guy gave a peculiar response during his victimology interview. They thought that he was evasive, and also they were suspicious of the fact that he agreed to come back to San Francisco for an interview while his wife was ill and hospitalized.

So they had settled on him as a suspect. Investigatively, if you did a time-line he was excluded, but they kept on trying to include him back in.

So Terry finally just lost patience with them and the Profiling Unit. He had repeatedly asked the Profiling Unit for a comparative study of serial bombers and they just never got around to it. It took them a long time to do anything and they essentially told Terry that the profile was the profile and they couldn't assign anyone full time to the task force.

Terry also changed the organization of the Task Force into three squads: a suspect squad, an investigative squad to reinvestigate each event, and finally an administrative squad which handled input from the public and everything else.

Terry and the SAC in San Francisco, Jim Freeman, worked together to kind of really shape a different kind of an investigation. Luckily for them, they got the direct support of Louis Freeh after the second fatality in December, 1994. I had just come on the Task Force when the second fatality happened: an advertising executive was blown up in his kitchen in front of his family in North Caldwell, New Jersey.

W: I remember that so well.

P: Yeah. Thomas Mosser, Burson Marsteller Advertising. It turned out that there was an obscure connection where Burson Marsteller was involved with PR for Exxon. We found documents in the cabin after Kaczynski's arrest in 1996 that he'd been convinced that after the Exxon Valdez environmental disaster in Alaska, this advertising executive in New Jersey had to die.

W: I remember, yes; reading that.

P: It's just amazing. With what we know now, it's no longer a mystery why the victimology just never went anywhere. Turned out he'd gotten Tom Mosser's home address from an edition of Who's Who in a library.

After that, Director Louis Freeh flew to San Francisco, and I mean it was an absolute - everybody was in turmoil, and the case had just literally further exploded. You know, there had been a lot of injuries to this point - and several near fatalities - but now Tom Mosser had been blown up in his own house. And it became a pretty much the number one priority case of the FBI.

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P: So now Terry had the horsepower of the Director of the FBI behind him, you know, to do what he really thought he needed to do. So we ran it very hard, and by the next April the Murrah Federal Building was bombed by Timothy McVeigh. Immediately everybody said it was Arab terrorists, you know international terrorists. Directly afterward, the final UNABOM device killed Gil Murray in Sacramento. We thought at the time that the Unabomber hadn't wanted to be outdone by the Oklahoma City bombing.

W: Exactly, seeing when that happened.

P: But you know, it turned out - and this was amazing - he was actually already on a Trailways Bus from Montana on his way to San Francisco with a completed bomb ready to send and letters ready to mail before the Murrah Building explosion ever happened.

W: Interesting.

P: So a lot of people still think that they're linked. But they weren't.

W: They were not, yeah.

P: Maybe cosmically, but not directly (laughing).

W: Yes.

P: The bomb on April 24<sup>th</sup> that killed Gilbert Murray was really devastating. The UNABOM devices were so powerful and so devastating by this point, and they were accelerating. People were dying, and we had no idea who this guy was.

Not that we didn't have suspects; we were running very hard, every lead that we could run down. We were giving it our all, and when we came to a blind alley we would just go back again.

It was relentless; there was a relentless nature to what we were doing. Terry was convinced we could solve this case. And I don't think that anybody had really thought that before or done things differently before, the way that Terry did then.

Luckily for us, though, that last bomb was accompanied by his mailing the first really detailed letter claiming responsibility to the *New York Times* for the bombings. And now we had real behavioral clues, so that when he wrote that he had a deal to propose - that he had an essay that he wanted published and by the *New York Times* in return for that he would offer to stop killing people - we had a new window of opportunity. Although he reserved the right to continue committing sabotage against the technological society, so he was kind of hedging his proposal.

W: Yes.

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P: At that point then there was a huge furor in the country about responding to a terrorist demand. Now it's like, okay, this thing is coming - what are we going to do with this? And right before he sent the manuscript to the *New York Times* and several other places he sent a letter to the *San Francisco Chronicle* saying that he was going to bomb an airliner out of Los Angeles. And everybody went into overdrive. In Los Angeles, my friend Kathleen McChesney - who was Assistant Associate Director, I think, at the time in Los Angeles - was running the emergency operation center at the airport. I mean the whole system went red.

It turned out that that letter was probably the most effective bomb that he ever threw or placed or sent, and it was literally a figurative bomb he threw to get attention for his manuscripts as they started arriving.

P: There was a huge battle, because of course you know the US Government doesn't negotiate with terrorists and the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* were actually being extorted. You know, "if you don't publish this I will kill more people." They asked us - the FBI - for a guarantee; like, "If we publish this, will he stop bombing?" I said, "No, actually he probably can't stop bombing - but we should publish it anyway."

W: Kathleen just one moment. I'm going to flip this over.

P: Oh okay.

W: Okay, it's on.

P: Okay, so here we are in the summer of 1995, and we've got the manuscript. It wasn't sent to the FBI but it's been sent to the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post* and Bob Guccione, the publisher of *Penthouse*, had offered to publish it, which was very amusing to us, but apparently not to the Unabomber. He sent a letter along with a copy of the manuscript to Bob Guccione, where he wrote that, "You could publish this but since your magazine is so disreputable I reserve the right to kill one more person." (laughing).

W: That's amazing.

P: It was just amazing you know. The Unabomber turned out to be a bit of a prude! Now, it's a pretty boring read, you know, if you've ever read the UNABOM Manifesto.

W: Just portions.

P: By this time, Quantico had relented because of the pressure being brought to bear by Headquarters and by Louis Freeh, and they had sent me a partner, Jim Fitzgerald, from the Profiling Unit. He was a brand new profiler, had been in New York for years, was originally from Philadelphia, and at that time he knew nothing about word content analysis or much else about the case.

P: But he volunteered to work with us, and he was on scene with us, and he was there when we got the manifesto. He didn't know anything about document analysis, but he just dove into it from ground zero. He started counting words, he started counting subjects, he started counting themes he picked out of the Manifesto. He and I became a team, and he was our liaison with Quantico, because essentially they really wouldn't talk to me. There was a real shut down in communications as far as, they were very angry about the fact that they were not ...

W: (unintel) a part ....

P: ... yes, and so Fitz, as we called him, was primary in dealing with that. So he came up with the fact that despite the fact that the Manifesto was supposedly about the technological society, the most common subject that he could find in the whole text was children: how they're raised, how they're schooled, how they're shaped, how they're forced to do things.

And I said, "You know this whole thing is autobiographical. He doesn't realize it, but he's giving us a portrait of his interior self here. And somebody is going to recognize him by these words."

W: Which happened?

P: It happened because we pushed that angle. We said to the media and the Department of Justice, "Look, we can't promise you that he's going to stop bombing if you publish this. But the reason you need to publish it is because we need to reach the one person out there - at least one person, because this guy has been writing for years and he's been very vociferous about these ideas - and someone out there knows this guy, and they're going to recognize him by his words."

So Terry and I and Jim Freeman, the SAC, went to DC, and joined in a huge debate around Louis Freeh's conference table. With, oh you know how it is at Headquarters they have, you know, everybody turns up around the conference table. There's all these Assistant Directors and everybody.

W: Right.

P: Jim Kallstrom was there from New York, and a Profiling Unit guy was there who was a little cool to me, but he was cordial until things kind of swung against his point of view.

Basically, you know, Louis went with our advice, and took me, Terry and Jim Freeman the next morning to see Janet Reno at the ...

W: Attorney General?

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P: ... Attorney General's office; and that was a real experience going in that building and sitting in her conference room.

W: I'm sure that was.

P: So we told her what we thought. She agreed with us and the next morning they had a meeting, a historic meeting with Arthur Sulzberger, Jr., the Publisher and the Editor of the *New York Times*, and Donald Graham the Publisher of the *Washington Post*, and it was decided in that meeting that they would agree to publish it, jointly publish it, because they were persuaded that it would lead to the identification of the Unabomber.

P: I mean, you know, neither the *New York Times* nor the *Post* are historically crazy about doing the bidding of the FBI, but this was something we were all in together, and they were victims in this case, too.

It's funny, because I talked about this in depth with the managing editors of the Associated Press at their National Convention a few weeks ago in Las Vegas, and they were fascinated by this unprecedented interaction between these newspapers and the FBI. Right now, at the new Museum of News in D.C. - you know the Newseum?

W: Yes. Uh huh.

P: The "G-Men and Journalists" exhibit is up on the hundredth year anniversary of the FBI, and the Newseum - the Freedom Foundation that sponsors it - invited me to come and talk to the managing editors of the Associated Press.

I think it's probably the first time that an FBI Agent or a former FBI Agent has been able to stand in front of that many newspaper editors and tell the real story of how this really happened.

W: That's so great. I'm sure that's a very learning experience for them too.

P: Yeah, it was great. And you know the "G-Men and Journalists" exhibit includes nine other cases that had a lot to do with the media, including Lindbergh kidnapping and the D.C. sniper case. I don't know if you've seen it, but it's a great exhibit.

W: I have not but I've heard that it was excellent.

P: Oh, you've got to go. It was great. The Unabomber cabin is there.

W: I heard that, yeah.

P: It's amazing. So many great experiences have come out of this case.

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P: So, it turned out that a Professor of Philosophy from Schenectady, New York named Linda Patrik happened to on sabbatical in Paris in September, 1995, where she saw in the English language edition of the *International Herald Tribune*, excerpts from the Manifesto that were published before full publication of the manifesto. She had never met her brother-in-law but had read things that he had written and knew a lot about him from talking to her husband, David Kaczynski.

So when David came to join her in Paris she told him, "Look, the FBI says this guy came from Chicago, was in Salt Lake and ended up in northern California. And not only does your brother fit that pattern but look at these words! You have to promise me you're going to read this Manifesto." David told her, "There's no way, you're crazy. You don't know Ted. He could never do something like this."

But when they came back to the States and he was able to read the whole thing at a library - because all the print copies had been snapped up, you know - people were just making a huge deal out of it. He got very worried when he read the first few paragraphs and started his own investigation; they hired a friend of theirs who was a private investigator in Chicago to try to find out what was going on with Ted because he had been estranged from the family for years.

W: From him for so long, right.

P: And they tried as hard as they could. They got a copy of the document and sent it on to Susan's, well Susan - I can't remember her last name. She was a private investigator in Chicago, and she suggested that they submit some writing of Ted's to a former FBI profiler, Clint van Zandt, for comparison. And the funny thing is, of course, that Clint van Zandt now says that he knew that this was the Unabomber (laughing).

W: He solved it, right?

P: Yeah his actual response was that there was a fifty-fifty chance this was the guy.

W: I read that.

P: A little birdie told me that at a Profiling Unit Christmas party that year, van Zandt laughed and said, "Hey, somebody came to me and thought their brother was the Unabomber."

It's interesting, you know, people's involvement with this case grew substantially after the (laughing) resolution of the case.

W: Yeah, that seems to happen.

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P: Van Zandt did tell them, "You know you should give this to the FBI." So eventually they hired an attorney who did that and I have to tell a hero story here of an Agent named Molly Flynn in Washington, D.C.

Molly Flynn at the time had been an Agent for I think either seven or nine years, I think it was seven. She was from Green Bay, Wisconsin. She was an attorney and she was on a squad in Washington.

W: The field office there?

P: The Washington, D.C. Field Office. One day in February 1996 she was asked by her supervisor to go pick up a document from an attorney's office and take it to the FBI Laboratory Document Examiner for comparison to the UNABOM Manifesto.

So she goes to this attorney's office and picks up this sample of writing. The attorney did not want to disclose the identity of his client, but he said "Take a look at this and see if you think that - do we have anything here? Is this prospectively a UNABOM suspect?"

Now by this time I must tell you that we had OVER fifty-five thousand people who had called the Task Force - the 1-800 number in San Francisco - and we had gotten literally a room full of mailings from the public saying that they knew the Unabomber. Women were calling and saying their ex-husbands were the Unabomber.

W: I could just imagine.

P: The number of people who called the Task Force and sent things to the Task Force by this time was legion. So we were overwhelmed, you know: be careful what you ask for, you may get it.

W: 'Cause you may get it, yes. Oh.

P: And we did. We got rooms full and fifty-five thousand people on the phone and you know leads came out of almost every single one. So we were running all over the map.

So here Molly Flynn, an Agent in the Washington Field Office, goes to the attorney's office, picks up this writing and takes it the Document Examiner at the FBI Lab. He took one look at it, looked at the typewriting comparison, and said, "Nope, it's not your guy. Not identical."

And she said, "Okay." And, of course, logically she should have just packed it up and sent it to the Task Force. But she, unlike most people - even in the FBI - had taken the time to read the UNABOM Manifesto. And she thought that there were some interesting parallels. And so instead of just sending it, she picked up the phone and called the Task Force in San Francisco.

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P: So she's in Washington. She calls and she gets a hold of - thank God - Joel Moss, the Suspect Squad Supervisor on the Task Force, also a former FCI guy and pretty much Terry's right hand man. He was in his office and hears an overhead page from the switchboard like, "Anybody on the UNABOM Task Force, please call the operator." Well you know this happened eight trillion times a day.

W: Because, I'm sure.

P: And so of course, nobody wants to pick up the phone. Well Joel had a personal rule that if nobody picked up after three pages, he'd pick it up even though he was busier than anybody.

So he picks up the phone and it's Molly. He's in the middle of looking at the latest of the over two thousand suspects by this time. By then, Terry had been made an ASAC.

Molly said, "Look I've got this thing. The Lab says it's not identical to the typewriter but I really, you know, I read the manifesto." Joel said, "You get points for reading that manifesto. It's pretty hard to read." But she was an attorney and she had an interest in this.

W: In that document.

P: And she said, "You know, it's probably nothing, but I just thought I'd give you a call." Joel said, "Well, fax it to me." So she did, and a few hours later he had it sitting on his desk. It had been faxed to him and his secretary brought it in and he started looking at it and he called me immediately. He and I had been partners for years and working cases together.

W: Right.

P: He called me immediately and he said, "What are you doing?" And I said, "Ahhh, what do you think I'm doing? I'm wading through, you know, a ton of paper." He said, "I have something I want you to look at."

So we went out of the office and sat down at a coffee shop down the street where we frequently retreated, I think it was a pie place, pie and coffee place.

He pushed a manila envelope across to me and I opened it and started looking at the pages. What I was looking at was an essay that had been written by Theodore Kaczynski in 1971. We didn't know at the time who this was, or who the client, David Kaczynski was, but by the time I got to the third paragraph I knew it was the Unabomber. The hair on the back of my neck ...

W: I was going to say you must have just had chills.

P: Oh yeah. Joel said, "What do you think?" And I said, "Well I'll tell you what, it's the first time in a year and a half that the hair on the back of my neck stood up." I said, "This is the guy." He said, "I know it is – NOW what are we going to do?" Because we had just come off a huge suspect investigation. It was the best one we'd had yet, and we'd pulled out all the stops. Everybody was exhausted and here we were, we were going to say ...

W: This is the guy?

P: ... this is the guy. So the next day we told Terry we needed to see him at lunch. He said, "Well, I got to have lunch with the boss." Joel said, "No, cancel it, you need to see us." So Terry and one of his other supervisors, Max Noel - who had been a criminal guy working this case forensically for years, and who was adamant that behavioral work was never going to get us anywhere in this case – showed up at Max's Opera Plaza restaurant to meet us. We said, "Look, this is who we think it is." Max of course immediately said, "This is crazy." I looked at Joel across the table and I said, "We shouldn't have brought it to him here, this was the wrong time." And Terry was kind of stung at that and Joel said, "Terry, just take this home and read it."

So Terry took it home and about midnight he was lying on the couch at home, his wife Joy was watching TV. Terry finally starts flipping through the document and he immediately jumps up off the couch and says, "Joy, I think we found the Unabomber," and everything went from there.

So the next day we talked to the SAC, Jim Freeman, and by the end of the week we had found out - this was February, 1996 - we had found out who the attorney's client was. We persuaded the attorney to bring his clients to Washington, D.C., for an interview. That's when we went and did the first interview in Washington on Valentine's Day weekend in 1996.

W: 'Cause I read that you spent, well met in many places with him for about for a couple of months.

P: Oh yeah. The next weekend we met in him in Texas and drove for nearly 12 hours to his own remote cabin where he had kept a lot of letters from Ted. He had kept every letter he'd ever gotten from his brother.

W: That's amazing.

P: They were still in the envelopes they'd come in, so they all had the postmarks on them which was perfect for comparison purposes to important dates in the case. David's main objective in working with us was that he wanted to eliminate his brother as a UNABOM suspect. He just did not want believe that this was happening.

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P: But as we got more and more information we got from him, including information in the letters themselves, and I looked at it behaviorally, doing the whole family story and background, the more and more certain a few of us were that Theodore Kaczynski was the Unabomber.

Now, there were only about five people on the planet who thought that was the case: Terry, Joel, me, Jim Freeman, and Jim Fitzgerald, the profiler from Quantico.

W: Uh huh, that had been sent.

P: No one else believed it. We got huge arguments from all quarters, but we pretty much stayed the course and within about a month and a half I had met David with my partner in the interviews, Lee Stark, another Agent on the Task Force, and Molly Flynn. We got Molly involved too, and she kind of became a de facto part of our task force. We just said, yeah we need Molly with us. She was ...

W: A big part of this.

P: ... a big part of this, and never recognized for it actually. And so we had met David in Washington; the next weekend we went with him down to the badlands of southwest Texas where he had his cabin and more letters; the next weekend in Chicago where we found more letters and other evidence and then the following weekend in Schenectady, New York, where his mother had just moved to be near him.

By April, we had people in Lincoln, Montana where Kaczynski lived, including a couple of undercover people who were trying to keep an eye on him. It was dead winter - big blizzard time there - but they needed to make sure that he wasn't going on the road and mailing any more bombs.

W: Right. Now, how was he found in his cabin? Did the undercover agents find the place?

P: No. David Kaczynski told us all about where the cabin was.

W: Oh, David had known. I thought he didn't, hadn't been in touch.

P: David had been there ten years earlier

W: Oh, okay.

P: The guy that sold Ted the property in 1971 to build the cabin on had a mill, a saw mill, next to a dirt road that lead to Kaczynski's cabin. His name was Butch Gehring, and the agents up there contacted him very discreetly and got him to tell them more about Kaczynski. They also got a Forest Service officer named Jerry Burns to help them work out an approach to the cabin if they needed to.

P: What eventually happened was that on the basis of all the information that we had, which was largely behavioral - kind of the first federal search warrant of its type - all we had been able to get was a search warrant, not an arrest warrant. So what we needed to do was get him safely out of the cabin.

So we were carefully planning how to do that when Dan Rather one day picked up the phone and called Louis Freeh, the Director of the FBI and said, "We have a source who says that your guy is in Montana and you're going to serve a search warrant and we're going to go with it on the nightly news." Louis asked him to hold the story for twenty-four hours and, in the meanwhile, we moved about fifty people, actually two hundred people in the long run, up to Montana, where we got ready, encircled the cabin with SWAT teams and made the arrest on April 3<sup>rd</sup>. Well, actually served the search warrant on April 3<sup>rd</sup> and you know we ...

W: And then just found so much.

P: ... were very worried that the cabin would be booby-trapped.

W: Yes.

P: So it was a very dicey thing. But it turned out that he had been so careful over all those years to not do any UNABOM activity - nothing that would trace anything to Montana - that the cabin was just literally a gold mine of evidence. So that's how ...

W: And that must have just been thrilling.

P: Walking into it was amazing. Walking into the cabin was just amazing. You know we got forty thousand pages of his writings out of the cabin. They had me and Fitz and Lee Stark, who had been working with me in interviews of David, come up to Montana to deal with the writings. I also had to make the call to David Kaczynski right as the media started beating down his door, and you know essentially he was convinced that we had handed him up to the media and betrayed him.

It was horrible. A real pressure cooker situation. By the time we got up to Montana to join everyone, they had already found a live bomb in the cabin. They had to proceed very carefully took more than a week to search the whole thing and recover all the evidence. They let us go inside and kind of get a feel for the guy. Those forty thousand pages of written documents in the cabin were all in code, in different languages and this and that, and there was actually a manila envelope labeled "Autobiography" that contained exactly that. I remember Jim Freeman said to us, to me and Jim Fitzgerald, "We're going to make you famous." For the next two weeks we set up an office in Helena, Montana where we read as much as we could of ...

W: Of his writing?

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P: his writings and for the next six months that's what I did, read and analyze his writings and worked for the Forensic Psychiatric Team that we hired for the prosecution phase. I had to kind of digest the writings and get the real pertinent stuff together for the attorneys and the forensic psychiatric team. That was my role until he was convicted.

W: That's amazing but as you said when you walked in that cabin it, to know all of the hard work that you all did for all those years, and that's just an amazing.

P: Well, you know, there's a great story. Pat Webb was a long time head of the bomb squad in San Francisco. He had worked Weathermen cases in the seventies and along with John Conway - the long-time UNABOM case Agent in San Francisco - had never given up on the case. So Pat, who had been searching for this guy for years, walked over with Terry and they stood in the doorway of the cabin and Pat - who's this hard boiled guy - stood there with tears just streaming down his face.

W: I'm sure.

P: He said, "I can't believe we got him. I can't believe this is it. We finally we got him." Because you know, Susan, if we hadn't worked the case the way we did, it's very likely we would still be looking for the Unabomber in this new age of terror, where resources are already strained. Practically the day that Kaczynski pled guilty in Sacramento in ninety-eight, Terry was grabbed by Louis Freeh to go to North Carolina to head the suspect search in Eric Robert Rudolph case.

W: Eric Rudolph yeah. That's amazing and I know you were so involved in that also.

P: Oh yeah.

W: But I, the whole case and the more you learn about it just from listening to you, the more amazing this whole investigation really was.

P: Well, in Louis Freeh's book, "My FBI" he said, he was "always amazed that these people just never quit" (laughing).

W: Just year after year, day after day.

P: And you know we didn't quit and basically it was because of Terry. It really was because of Terry Turchie.

W: That's something. And, you say he's still is in the FBI?

P: No, Terry Turchie is retired.

W: Oh, he's retired.

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P: And he's my co-author on the book.

W: That's right of course, yes.

P: Joel Moss, the UNABOM supervisor who got the fax from Molly Flynn, is still in the FBI – and so is Molly.

W: Okay, Joel is, yes.

P: Hopefully he'll be coming back to San Francisco and to an ASAC position. He's currently in the Inspection Division but yeah (laughing).

W: That's really something. That's so commendable.

P: Terry and I both left in 2001. Terry was the first Deputy Assistant Director for the FBI in the new Counter-Terrorism Division in ninety-nine. Louis Freeh was still Director.

W: I see.

P: After he had come back to San Francisco and become Associate SAC - there were still Associate SACs at the time - he was asked to come back as the first Deputy Assistant Director for Counter-Terrorism by Director Freeh and by Dale Watson.

W: His name I know, yes.

P: Dale was the AD and Terry was the DAD. After he was there a while, Terry decided we needed to know more about lone terrorists in general, so they commissioned me to come back and work at Headquarters to do a consolidated, cross-case behavioral study.

Once again Quantico was very incensed because they thought that this should be their purview, but they just weren't capable of turning something around that quickly. Terry wanted something produced quickly, so I ended up producing a report called "The Lone Terrorist" – that has since been re-discovered by the FBI (laughing).

W: That's amazing. Yes, I read about that.

P: You know, we have to be able to work these cases a little smarter in the future, because you're just not going to have the resources to spend on domestic terrorism when you've got the international terrorism ticket.

W: Exactly, and they're not going to go away either.

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P: Right. I just did a presentation the week before last at the Chicago Office and for the US Attorney, Pat Fitzgerald, for the Terrorism Liaison Committee and also the National Academy there, on the UNABOM case and lessons we learned. You know, about how to work these cases and what not to do, what doesn't work and what does work.

There are still people who say we did the wrong thing by publishing the manifesto.

W: Wow.

P: And there are still people who are adamant that the way that we worked the case was the wrong way.

P: In fact, Theodore Kaczynski was arrested in April, 1996, and by November we were under inspection. I became an inspection issue because I was not a profiler. What the heck was I doing working the case? And Terry became an inspection issue because he did such out of the box things. You know, he was sending people out to different offices to run leads when they were ignored or put on the slow boat by those divisions. He'd send Agents out from the Task Force to do it. And that is not usually done, as you know.

W: Exactly, right, right.

P: It wasn't real popular. But it was effective (laughing).

W: That's amazing. And I know you know as I said when we started I admire you so much for the powerful roles you've played in these major investigations and was there ever a problem of being taken seriously in that you were a female Agent?

P: Oh yeah.

W: And how did you go about handling that?

P: Well I'll tell you the first, the first advantage that I had was that in Foreign Counter-Intelligence, there was not as big a stigma around women Agents even at that time. My other female Agent friends who were in the criminal side - they had a little bit more of an uphill battle because they worked a lot more with people who came from the military or a police background where ...

W: ... that whole police, exactly.

P: ... where there was a prejudice that women couldn't do this or that. There were a lot of people, I remember even in my new Agents class, who thought that way. I remember that by the end of my time in training at Quantico, when I had finally worked myself into decent physical condition and gained a little bit more respect from some of the guys in the class, I remember one of giving me what he thought was a compliment, he said, "Well if we have to have women agents, Kathy, I think that you're the kind that we need." (laughing).

W: Exactly, he thinks he's giving you a compliment.

P: (Laughing) yeah. But you know, I'll tell you, Susan, in my opinion I had a huge advantage after ten years of being in the FBI where I had not found my niche, had not performed the way I had wanted to, and I had not been taken seriously in some instances. My reputation wasn't stellar.

But then I had the advantage of having a supervisor come in, Terry Turchie, who recognized that I was kind of a maverick but I could do things that were useful.

What he was a genius at was figuring out talents that people had, looking for talent and looking for ability in other than the usual go-to guys in the office; because you know there's always this, "Hey, these are the stars of the office and then these people are just the hump agents in the office."

Well you know most of the women at that time were not going to be thought of as stars anyway. And then you know the people who were in Foreign Counter-Intelligence – at the time bombing cases were considered criminal cases, and you know the tough guys who work criminal cases – in those guys their attention span can be very short, and a case like UNABOM...

W: They could not have handled.

P: No, well they proved over and over again that they couldn't handle it.

W: Yes.

P: And a lot of them were excused from the Task Force rather abruptly when it became obvious that they were bored doing the same thing every day. But you have to go through a lot of boring detail. It's hard to bore me; that's one good thing about it.

W: Which is commendable.

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P: I'm very easily amused (laughing). So I did have an advantage in that I had a supervisor who recognized my ability, and by the time I had been an agent for only about twelve years or so, I mean, I had the advantage of being, of becoming known to the Director of the FBI. And kind of getting his seal of approval. Well, as a brick agent, you can't get any better than that.

W: Right. That's right you're golden.

P: You're golden there. And then of course also Janet Reno, you know, knew me.

W: Yes, that's great.

P: So very few Agents, women Agents or male Agents get that kind of, you know recognition. So I have to say that my timing was great, and I also had great backing.

But I had the same kind of issues and difficulties that a lot of other women had, you know, some of the early women because I think I was only about the hundred and thirtieth or in the first hundred and twenty women or so in the Bureau. And I think you were in that group.

W: I would have been yeah because I came in September of seventy-nine. So yeah it wasn't, and you know we had in our class about, I think we were the largest group of women. We had about ten in our Training class.

P: My Training class, twenty-nine went in and twenty-nine came out which was really rare. But we were the last class with just two women, or one or two women in it, because the class after me started with ten. They really started recruiting women heavily.

W: Exactly, right around that time.

P: Yeah, in seventy-eight.

W: Yeah. Well and I know there's so much more that you were involved with but I really do, I don't want to test your voice anymore.

P: (Laughing) Well I appreciate your letting me talk about it.

W: Oh just so, so amazing. It really is such an amazing case.

P: It really was a wonderful career.

W: It was and as I said continuing to have a wonderful career and I just think that's just commendable.

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P: Well thank you. We're very worried that the FBI is not being given its proper shake right now in this current time. I mean we're doing this interview in, when we're coming up on a new presidential administration next year. We have just written this book, Homeland Insecurity - How Washington Politicians Have Made America Less Safe, where we take some heavy shots at politicians on both sides of the aisle for the benefit of the FBI. We're going to be in Washington next week starting the tour for it.

W: That's great and I read over, you know, what the book involved and myself and my husband both said, "We've got to go get this book."

P: Oh absolutely.

W: So no, I'm going to enjoy getting it and reading it and think I have talked with this woman who is co-author.

P: Yeah absolutely. I'll be happy to autograph it for you when we're there.

W: Oh that'll be great, okay.

P: Sure.

W: But I thank you so much for your time and if you ever think of some questions that came up or something that you need information on let me know.

P: Oh I sure will. But I really appreciate what you're doing and, you know, it's more important now than ever, I think.

W: I agree. I really do. And this information is going to be so; I know people are just going to love reading this. So thank you again for your time.

P: Great.

W: So thank you again for your time and I hope to run across your path sometime in the future.

P: Great. Thank you, Susan.

W: Have a good day.

P: You too.

W: Thanks, Kathleen.